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ABSTRACT
In recent years, neural networks have become the default choice for
image classication and many other learning tasks, even though
they are vulnerable to so-called adversarial aacks. To increase
their robustness against these aacks, there have emerged numer-
ous detection mechanisms that aim to automatically determine if
an input is adversarial. However, state-of-the-art detection mech-
anisms either rely on being tuned for each type of aack, or they
do not generalize across dierent aack types. To alleviate these
issues, we propose a novel technique for adversarial-image detec-
tion, RAID, that trains a secondary classier to identify dierences
in neuron activation values between benign and adversarial inputs.
Our technique is bothmore reliable andmore eective than the state
of the art when evaluated against six popular aacks. Moreover, a
straightforward extension of RAID increases its robustness against
detection-aware adversaries without aecting its eectiveness.
1 INTRODUCTION
ere is no doubt that neural networks are becoming rapidly and
increasingly prevalent. eir success has been particularly impres-
sive for the task of accurately recognizing paerns and classifying
images [57], on which we focus here. Even though such networks
are able to achieve very high accuracy for “normal” (i.e., benign)
images, they may be tricked by adversaries into providing wrong
classications. More specically, given a correctly classied image,
an adversary may perturb it slightly—typically almost unnoticeably
according to human perception—to generate an image that is classi-
ed dierently. Such images are referred to as adversarial [58] and
pose a serious threat to emerging applications of machine learning,
such as autonomous driving [18, 44].
To protect neural networks against adversarial aacks, there
have emerged numerous defense mechanisms that aim to correctly
classify adversarial inputs. However, most of these defenses have
not been found eective in preventing adversarial images from
being misclassied [9]. As a result, the research community has
also focused on automated detection of adversarial images, that is,
on devising mechanisms for detecting whether an input to a neural
network is adversarial (see [11] for examples).
Adversarial-image detection. In the context of adversarial-
image detection, some state-of-the-art detection mechanisms are
classier based, that is, they train a secondary classier for de-
termining whether inputs of a neural network are adversarial. A
recent, notable example is SADL [29], an approach that relies on
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the observation that “surprising” inputs are more likely to be ad-
versarial. Depending on the surprise measure, the eectiveness of
this approach relies on tuning its hyper-parameters, namely which
neurons are used to measure surprise, for each type of aack. How-
ever, in practice, detection mechanisms are typically unaware of
the types of incoming aacks.
In terms of classier-free detection mechanisms, a novel exam-
ple is mMutant [60], which assumes adversarial images to be more
“sensitive” than normal ones. More specically, the assumption
is that the classication outcome for adversarial inputs is more
likely to change when performing minor mutations to the neural
network. However, this assumption does not generalize to adver-
sarial inputs with a high prediction condence, that is, inputs for
which the neural network provides a wrong classication with high
condence.
Our approach. To alleviate these issues, we present a new
adversarial-image detection technique, called RAID. Our technique
is based on teaching a secondary classier to recognize dierences
in neuron activation values between adversarial and normal inputs.
We show that the eectiveness of RAID is stable with respect to its
hyper-parameters across a wide range of adversarial aacks. RAID
consistently outperforms SADL and mMutant on these aacks by
up to 88%. Moreover, in contrast to these techniques, there exists
a simple extension to RAID that increases its robustness against
detection-aware adversaries without aecting its eectiveness.
Contributions. Our paper makes the following contributions:
(1) We present a simple, yet very eective, adversarial-image
detection technique for neural networks.
(2) We extend our technique to increase its robustness against
stronger adversaries that can tailor their aacks to specic
detection mechanisms.
(3) We implement our approach and make the implementation
publicly available.
(4) We extensively evaluate our approach and compare it with
three state-of-the-art detection techniques.
Outline. e next section provides background on dierent
types of adversaries and aacks. Sect. 3 explains our adversarial-
image detection approach. We present our experimental evaluation
in Sect. 4, discuss related work in Sect. 5, and conclude in Sect. 6.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we give a short overview of threat models and
adversarial aacks.
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2.1 reat Models
A threat model describes the conditions under which a detection
mechanism is designed to work. Consequently, the threat model is
necessary for assessing the eectiveness of a detector [9].
Adversarial aacks are typically categorized according to two
main threat models: (1) white-box aacks, where the adversary has
perfect knowledge of the neural network including, for example,
its architecture and parameters, and (2) black-box aacks, which
generate adversarial examples without any internal information
about the neural network. In this work, we consider the stronger
white-box threat model although our technique is also applicable
against black-box aacks. White-box adversaries come in two
capacities, namely static and adaptive.
Static adversaries. A static adversary is an aacker that is un-
aware of any detection mechanism protecting a network model
against adversarial aacks. A static adversary makes use of existing
white-box aacks to generate adversarial examples but does not
tailor these aacks to breach any specic detection mechanism.
Adaptive adversaries. An adaptive adversary is an aacker that
is aware of the detection mechanism protecting a network model, if
any. Such an adversary also has knowledge of internal parameters
of the detectionmechanism. As a result, it may adapt the adversarial
aacks it generates to breach the particular detection mechanism
that is in place. Adaptive adversaries are clearly more powerful
than static ones.
In this paper, we evaluate our approach as well as three state-
of-the-art adversarial-image detection techniques on several static
adversaries. We also extend our approach to adaptive adversaries
and reason about its eectiveness.
2.2 Adversarial Attacks
In the context of deep learning, adversarial examples are generally
dened as inputs to a neural network that are specically craed
to trick it into making a wrong prediction [9]. Practically, such
examples are generated by slightly distorting correctly classied
inputs. Since discovering the vulnerability of neural networks to
adversarial examples [58], there have emerged numerous aacks in
the literature, some of which have gained signicant traction and
are routinely used as benchmarks for evaluating both other aacks
as well as detection mechanisms.
In our experiments, we also use such well-known aacks to
evaluate the eectiveness of our approach against static adversaries.
More specically, we use the following six aacks:
(1) Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [36]
(2) Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [23]
(3) Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [31]
(4) DeepFool (DF) [39]
(5) Carlini-Wagner (CW) [13]
(6) Jacobian Saliency Map Aack (JSMA) [45]
Each of these aacks species an upper bound on the amount
of allowed distortion. is bound is typically dened in terms of
norms, such as L∞, L2, and L0. For example, DF is an L2 aack,
meaning that the L2 norm of original and adversarial inputs cannot
be larger than a given bound. Regarding the above aacks, PGD,
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Figure 1: Dierences in neuron activation values between
normal and adversarial inputs.
FGSM, and BIM are L∞ aacks, DF and CW L2, and JSMA L0. e
L2 aacks are found to be stronger than the others [13].
As we previouslymentioned, these are white-box aacks of static
adversaries. Aacks of adaptive adversaries are specically tailored
to the detection mechanism of the model under threat. erefore,
dierent detection mechanisms require dierent aacks, which
means that there is no o-the-shelf adaptive adversary.
3 OUR APPROACH
Correctly classied (or normal) and adversarial inputs might look
almost identical to the human eye. However, the activation nger-
prints, that is, the neuron activation values, that these two kinds
of inputs leave on a neural network are certainly dierent. is
is because adversarial inputs cause the neural network to make
a dierent prediction, and this dierence is manifested through a
change in the activation values of the neurons in the output network
layer. For the activation values of these neurons to be dierent,
there must also be changes in the activation values of neurons in
previous layers.
As an example, we train a neural network on the MNIST [2]
dataset for identifying handwrien-digit images. We then collect
the activation values of four arbitrarily selected neurons for both
normal and adversarial images, which are generated by the PGD
aack. On the le of Fig. 1, we draw a box-plot of their activation
values distinguishing between normal and adversarial images. As
shown in the gure, there is a clear dierence in the activation
values of these neurons for the two kinds of images. In this paper,
we present a Randomized Adversarial-Image Detection approach,
which we call RAID, leveraging exactly this dierence.
Fig. 2 gives an overview of RAID. In step 1, RAID provides a
set of normal inputs to the neural network under threat, and for
each input, records the activation values of every neuron. It also
calculates the mean activation value of every neuron for all normal
inputs. In step 2, RAID repeats this process for adversarial inputs
that are generated by perturbing the normal inputs of the rst step.
In step 3, RAID selects a number of neurons to monitor based on
the mean dierence in activation values. In step 4, RAID trains a
detection classier based on the recorded activation values of the
selected neurons.
To decide whether a new input is adversarial, RAID monitors
the activation values of the selected neurons during prediction to
obtain the ngerprint that is fed to the trained detection classier.
3.1 Denitions
Let N = {n1,n2, . . . } be the set of all neurons (excluding input and
output layers) in a neural network NN and X = {x1,x2, . . . } an
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Figure 2: Overview of RAID.
arbitrary set of inputs. We denote the activation value of a neuron
ni for an input x j as ni (x j ).
We call ni (X ) the activation-value block of ni with respect to
inputs X , which essentially denotes a vector of activation values
ni (x j ) for each input x j ∈ X (neuron ni is xed).
N stands for an ordered subset of all neurons N in the neural
network. N (x j ) denotes the activation ngerprint (AF) of input x j
on the neurons in subset N . e activation ngerprint is dened as
a vector of activation values ni (x j ) for each neuron ni ∈ N (input
x j is xed).
N (X ) yields a two-dimensional matrix, where each row corre-
sponds to the activation ngerprint of an input x j ∈ X on neurons
N and each column to the activation-value block of a neuronni ∈ N
with respect to inputs X .
We dene a mean activation ngerprint, denoted N (X ), as a
vector that replaces each activation-value block inN (X ) by its mean
activation value. en, the dierence of mean activation ngerprints
for two sets of inputsX and Y is dened as —N (X )−N (Y )—, where
the subtraction is performed element-wise.
3.2 RAID
RAID, is a simple, yet very eective, technique for detecting adver-
sarial images. It is based on the key insight of leveraging dierences
in the activation ngerprints that normal and adversarial inputs
leave on the NN under threat.
To make use of this insight, RAID starts by computing N(X ) and
N(X ′) for all neurons in NN, where X is a set of normal inputs,
and X ′ the set of adversarial inputs generated by perturbing the
inputs in X . In our experience, however, not all neurons behave
dierently for normal and adversarial inputs. For instance, it could
be the case that, for a particular neuron ni , the activation-value
blocks ni (X ) and ni (X ′) in N(X ) and N(X ′), respectively, contain
similar activation values.
On the right of Fig. 1, we plot the dierenceN(M)−N(M ′) for all
neurons in a simple neural network trained on the MNIST dataset.
Here,M denotes the set of all images in MNIST andM ′ the adver-
sarial images generated by DF. Each point in the gure corresponds
to n(M) − n(M ′), that is, the dierence of mean activation-value
blocks. Neurons with |n(M) −n(M ′)| < 0.03 appear in red, neurons
with |n(M) − n(M ′)| > 0.35 in yellow, and the remaining neurons
in black. We call red neurons inessential as their behavior does not
change signicantly for images inM andM ′. Consequently, such
neurons are not useful for detecting adversarial examples. On the
other hand, yellow neurons have a very clear dierence in behavior
and should be leveraged.
Our technique, therefore, lters out inessential neurons. More
specically, RAID computes and sorts the vector |N(X ) − N(X ′)|.
en, based on a given percentage, which is a hyper-parameter of
our technique called ltering threshold, RAID drops the percentage
of this sorted vector with the lowest activation values.
RAID uses the activation values of the remaining essential neu-
rons to train an adversarial-input detection classier. In particular,
our technique randomly selects a number of essential neurons to
monitor, which is also a hyper-parameter of RAID. It then labels
each AF of input x ∈ X on the monitored neurons as normal, and
each AF of x ′ ∈ X ′ as adversarial. ese AFs together with their
labels are used to train our detection classier. In Sect. 4, we show
how the number of monitored neurons impacts the eectiveness
of our technique. We also discuss why we randomly select the
monitored neurons, instead of deterministically picking them.
e detection classier takes the AF that a new input of the neu-
ral network leaves on the monitored neurons and decides whether
the input is adversarial. Due to the relatively small number of moni-
tored neurons, the input space of the detection classier is not high
dimensional, that is, the AFs do not have too many features. As a
result, this allows us to choose a simple type of classier without
compromising the eectiveness of our approach. Instead of training
a large detection neural network as in existing classier-based work
(e.g., [38]), our experiments demonstrate the competitive eective-
ness of much simpler classiers, such as decision trees, random
forests, etc.
3.3 P-RAID: Pooled RAID
Existing classier-based detection techniques [22, 24, 38] have been
very successful in detecting adversarial examples. Despite their
success, they have been criticized for being vulnerable to adap-
tive white-box aacks [11]. In particular, the criticism is that if a
white-box aack can trick a neural network into making a wrong
prediction, then it should also be able to bypass the detection clas-
sier by adapting its adversarial aacks. We, therefore, extend our
approach to be robust against adaptive white-box aacks. We refer
to our extended technique as P-RAID, for Pooled-RAID.
e dierence between RAID and P-RAID consists in training
a pool of detection classiers, instead of a single one. Each classi-
er in the pool is trained with the AFs le on an equal number of
randomly selected essential neurons. ese neurons are selected
uniformly from the entire NN (aer having ltered out the inessen-
tial neurons). is results in distinct classiers, which however are
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trained for the same goal. We pick an equal number of neurons for
each classier so that they are all similarly eective in detecting
adversarial examples—recall that the number of monitored neurons
impacts the eectiveness of the classiers.
Now, for each new input of the neural network, P-RAID selects
uniformly at random a detection classier from the pool. e se-
lected classier determines if the input is adversarial. As we show
in Sect. 4, extending our technique in this way does not impact
its eectiveness. On the contrary, we argue that it improves its
robustness against adaptive white-box aacks. Given that P-RAID
picks the detection classier nondeterministically for each input,
an adaptive aacker would have to tailor its adversarial aacks to
all classiers in the pool. is is infeasible for three main reasons.
First, the size of the pool can be arbitrarily large. Second, an aack
that is optimized against one classier might be impossible to also
optimize against another since they are trained on dierent sets of
neurons. ird, the pool of classiers could contain dierent clas-
sier types (e.g., k-nearest neighbors, random forests, etc.), which
makes it even more dicult to tailor an aack to all classiers.
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we address the following research questions using
established evaluation guidelines for adversarial robustness [9, 11]:
RQ1: How eective is our approach in detecting adversarial
images?
RQ2: Does our approach generalize within and across aack
norms?
RQ3: How does our approach compare with state-of-the-art
detection techniques?
RQ4: How does the selection of monitored neurons impact
the eectiveness of our approach?
RQ5: How do multiple detection classiers impact the eec-
tiveness of our approach?
RQ6: How eective are dierent detection classier types?
4.1 Implementation
We implemented (P-)RAID in Python using the popular machine-
learning framework Keras [1] (v2.3.1) with the Tensorow [3]
(v1.15.0) back-end for analyzing neural networks. We also em-
ploy the scikit-learn library [47] for training detection classiers.
Last, we use IBM’s Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART) [41]
for generating adversarial examples. Our implementation is open
source.
4.2 Setup
We set up our experiments as follows.
Datasets and network models. We evaluate our technique on
neural-network models trained on two popular datasets, namely
MNIST [2] and CIFAR-10 [30]. MNIST is a dataset for recognizing
handwrien-digit images, whereas the CIFAR-10 dataset focuses
on recognizing objects and classifying them into ten categories. It
is common to evaluate the eectiveness of adversarial-image detec-
tion techniques on these two datasets (e.g., [29, 60]). For MNIST, we
trained a 5-layer convolutional neural network (ConvNet), with 320
neurons and 99.31% accuracy (when using 60,000 images for train-
ing and 10,000 for testing). For CIFAR-10, we trained a 12-layer
ConvNet, with 2,208 neurons and 82.27% accuracy (when using
50,000 images for training and 10,000 for testing). ese specic
network models have also been used to evaluate a recent related
technique [29].
Adversarial images. We generate adversarial images using six
well-known aacks (see Sect. 2.2). e hyper-parameter congura-
tion of each aack is given below:
– PGD: is is an iterative L∞-norm aack. We set the max-
imum number of iterations to 100 and the maximum dis-
tortion to 0.3 in terms of the L∞ norm.
– FGSM: is is a one step L∞-norm aack. We set the
maximum distortion to 0.3 in terms of the L∞ norm.
– BIM: is aack is the iterative version of the FGSM aack.
e maximum number of iterations is set to 100 and the
maximum distortion to 0.3 in terms of the L∞ norm.
– DF: is is an iterative L2-norm aack. We set the maxi-
mum number of iterations to 100.
– CW: Although there is an L∞-norm version of this aack,
we employ its stronger L2-norm version [13]. We use the
default seings of the ART library [41].
– JSMA:is is an L0-norm aack. We set parameter gamma
bounding the fraction of perturbed features to 1.0.
We use each of these aacks to generate adversarial images in
the following way. For each dataset, we split the test set, that is,
the 10,000 images, into its halves. From each set of 5,000 original
images, we remove any misclassied images and label the rest as
normal. Next, we use each of the above aacks to generate 5,000
adversarial images for each set of normal images. We discard any
generated images that are correctly classied and label the rest
as adversarial. We then use one set of normal images together
with its corresponding adversarial images to train a random-forest
classier based on the activation values of the monitored neurons.
e remaining normal and adversarial images are used to test the
ability of the classier to detect adversarial images.
Existing detection techniques. In our experiments, we com-
pare our approach with three state-of-the-art adversarial-image
detection techniques from the literature [29, 60], two of which are
classier based and one is not.
Kim et al. [29] present two techniques based on the surprise
measure of a given input to a neural network. ey show that this
surprise measure can be used to detect adversarial inputs, under
the assumption that such inputs are more surprising than nor-
mal ones. e rst technique presented in their paper, namely
Likelihood-based Surprise Adequacy (LSA), is an extension of pre-
vious work [19]. In LSA, they estimate the probability density
function of each neuron’s activation values, which is then used to
measure how surprising an incoming input is. e second tech-
nique, namely Distance-based Surprise Adequacy (DSA), is a novel
method based on the activation values of a set of neurons (i.e., a
layer of neurons). In DSA, the surprise of an input x is measured by
the distances between the activation-value vectors of the selected
neurons from the closest input y in the same class and between y
and the closest input z in a dierent class. Both LSA and DSA train
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a classier based on surprise values to distinguish adversarial and
normal examples.
e third technique, mMutant [60], is based on the observation
that, compared to a normal example, it is easier to change the
class of an adversarial example via small mutations to the neural
network. ey rst dene the label change rate (LCR) of an input
on slightly mutated versions of the original neural network. e
LCR is found by dividing the number of predictions on mutated
models deviating from the original prediction over the number of
mutated models. e fundamental assumption behind mMutant
is that the LCR of adversarial inputs is higher than the LCR of
normal ones. We investigated the validity of this assumption, and
our experiments suggest that it does not necessarily hold in general.
eir paper provides a detection algorithm based on this assumption
that tries to identify an LCR threshold for distinguishing between
normal and adversarial inputs. However, this algorithm yields
worse results [60] when compared to the AUC score achieved by
the LCRs directly. For this reason, we do not consider it here.
For selecting hyper-parameters for the above techniques, we
pick the conguration that achieves the best results. For LSA and
DSA, we pick the best layers as proposed in the original paper since
we use the same neural networks in our evaluation. For the aacks
that are not included in the original paper, we still try to pick the
layer that is the most eective. Note that, by re-optimizing hyper-
parameters for each experiment, we give these two techniques
a signicant advantage over others (incl. RAID). e authors of
mMutant describe four mutation operators for neural networks. We
limit our comparison to Neuron Activation Inverse (NAI), which
the authors show to be most eective.
Machine specications. We conducted all our experiments on
a 32-core Intel ® Xeon ® Gold 6134M CPU@ 3.20GHmachine with
768GB of memory, running Debian v10.
4.3 Metrics
We evaluate the eectiveness of our approach using the following
metrics.
Detection accuracy. e accuracy of a detection technique is a
standard metric. For a set containing both normal and adversarial
images, accuracy is the percentage of all images that are correctly
detected as normal or adversarial. Higher accuracy suggests a beer
detection technique.
True-positive rate. We refer to the adversarial images that are
correctly identied by our technique as true positives (TP), and to
those that are incorrectly identied as false negatives (FN). e
true-positive rate (TPR) is dened as TPTP+FN and denotes the ratio
of correctly detected adversarial images over all adversarial images.
A higher true-positive rate is beer.
False-positive rate. We refer to the normal images that are
correctly identied by our technique as true negatives (TN), and
to those that are incorrectly identied as false positives (FP). e
false-positive rate (FPR) is dened as FPFP+TN and denotes the ratio
of normal images that are detected as adversarial over all normal
images. A lower false-positive rate is beer.
Area under curve of receiver operator characteristic. e re-
ceiver operator characteristic (ROC) curve plots the TPR against the
FPR for all classication thresholds, which dene the classication
boundary between classes. Assuming that a detection classier is
expected to rank adversarial images higher than normal ones, the
area under the ROC curve (AUC) denotes the probability that a ran-
domly chosen adversarial image is ranked higher than a randomly
chosen normal image. An AUC score that is closer to 1 is beer.
4.4 Results
We now present our experimental results for each of the above
research questions.
Unless stated otherwise, we congured our implementation to
use exactly one classier (not a pool), which is a random forest
with 32 decision trees (or estimators). Aer ltering out 50% of
the neurons in the networks for MNIST and CIFAR-10, the random
forest is trained with the activation values of 64 randomly selected
neurons.
We repeated all of our experiments 8 times, each time using a
dierent random seed for the classier and a dierent randomly
selected set of neurons. Unless we explicitly state otherwise, the rest
of this section reports mean results and their standard deviation.
RQ1: Adversarial-image detection. To measure the eective-
ness of our approach in detecting adversarial images, we evaluate it
against several well-known aacks. Tabs. 1 and 2 show the results
for the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, respectively.
e rst column of the tables indicates the used aack. For
instance, to obtain the results of the PGD row, we trained and
tested our classier using two dierent sets, each containing ∼5,000
normal images as well as ∼5,000 adversarial ones, which were
generated by the PGD aack. Note that the number of images is
approximate due to ltering, which is described in detail in Sect. 4.2.
For L2, we trained and tested using ∼5,000 normal images, ∼5,000
adversarial images generated by DF, and ∼5,000 adversarial images
generated by CW. For L∞, we used PGD, FGSM, and BIM to generate
adversarial images, and for L∗, all six aacks. Note that an L0 row
corresponds to the JSMA one as JSMA is the only L0 aack used
in our experiments. e remaining columns of the tables show the
detection accuracy, the true- and false-positive rates, the area under
the ROC curve, the number of true and false positives as well as
the number of true and false negatives.
As shown in Tabs. 1 and 2, RAID is most eective in detecting
L∞ aacks, with accuracy, TPR, and AUC at 1.00 and FPR at 0.00,
which constitute the theoretical best. RAID is least eective for L2
aacks; this is to be expected since these are more powerful [11].
Naturally, the eectiveness for L∗ lies in-between.
Tab. 3 shows the AUC score achieved by RAIDwhen trained with
normal and adversarial images generated by all aacks (L∗) and
tested on normal and adversarial images generated by the aacks
shown in the columns of the table. For example, when training
RAID with all aacks, it achieves an AUC score of 1.0 when tested
only on FGSM aacks. Again, our approach is most eective in
detecting L∞ aacks and slightly less eective for others.
Since RAID detects an adversarial image based on the prediction
of a classier, its running time for a single input is in the order
of milliseconds. Training the classier(s) used by (P-)RAID takes
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Table 1: Eectiveness of RAID in detecting adversarial images generated by six attacks for MNIST.
Accuracy TPR FPR AUC TP FP TN FN
L∗ 0.96 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.00 0.16 ± 0.02 0.99 ± 0.00 23 482.62 ± 39.76 813.50 ± 71.44 4089.50 ± 71.44 220.38 ± 39.76
L∞ 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 14 526.75 ± 2.11 9.38 ± 8.75 4893.62 ± 8.75 2.25 ± 2.11
L2 0.94 ± 0.00 0.96 ± 0.01 0.09 ± 0.01 0.98 ± 0.00 8784.75 ± 44.74 423.50 ± 21.51 4479.50 ± 21.51 369.25 ± 44.74
PGD 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 4969.62 ± 0.86 5.75 ± 6.56 4897.25 ± 6.56 1.38 ± 0.86
FGSM 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 4617.00 ± 3.12 1.00 ± 1.12 4902.00 ± 1.12 2.00 ± 3.12
BIM 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 4936.38 ± 3.00 2.88 ± 4.73 4900.12 ± 4.73 2.62 ± 3.00
DF 0.94 ± 0.00 0.88 ± 0.01 0.01 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.00 3709.25 ± 34.23 68.25 ± 25.55 4834.75 ± 25.55 511.75 ± 34.23
CW 0.94 ± 0.01 0.93 ± 0.03 0.05 ± 0.01 0.98 ± 0.01 4633.50 ± 59.42 284.62 ± 13.90 4618.37 ± 13.90 299.50 ± 59.42
JSMA 0.95 ± 0.00 0.95 ± 0.01 0.06 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.00 4690.25 ± 9.87 285.38 ± 22.53 4617.62 ± 22.53 220.75 ± 9.87
Table 2: Eectiveness of RAID in detecting adversarial images generated by six attacks for CIFAR-10.
Accuracy TPR FPR AUC TP FP TN FN
L∗ 0.95 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.00 0.34 ± 0.02 0.96 ± 0.00 26 346.56 ± 8.67 1230.78 ± 34.95 2360.22 ± 34.95 296.44 ± 8.67
L∞ 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 14 526.75 ± 2.11 9.38 ± 8.75 4893.62 ± 8.75 2.25 ± 2.11
L2 0.88 ± 0.00 0.96 ± 0.00 0.30 ± 0.01 0.90 ± 0.00 7744.25 ± 9.27 1089.62 ± 30.60 2504.38 ± 30.60 358.75 ± 9.27
PGD 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 4781.25 ± 0.83 0.50 ± 0.71 3587.50 ± 0.71 0.75 ± 0.83
FGSM 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 4289.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 3588.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00
BIM 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 3588.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 0.00 ± 0.00 4631.00 ± 0.00
DF 0.83 ± 0.00 0.87 ± 0.00 0.20 ± 0.00 0.91 ± 0.00 3470.00 ± 17.36 719.88 ± 19.76 2874.12 ± 19.76 535.00 ± 17.36
CW 0.85 ± 0.00 0.93 ± 0.01 0.24 ± 0.01 0.91 ± 0.01 3816.25 ± 14.62 842.50 ± 32.76 2745.50 ± 32.76 281.75 ± 14.62
JSMA 0.90 ± 0.00 0.93 ± 0.01 0.13 ± 0.01 0.96 ± 0.00 4470.75 ± 31.95 481.38 ± 25.27 3106.62 ± 25.27 364.25 ± 31.95
longer, but this process is performed once and oine. Training time
depends on three factors: (1) number of training inputs, (2) number
of features in each input, and (3) internal complexity of the classi-
er(s) (e.g., number of estimators in a random forest). For RAID’s
best conguration described at the beginning of this subsection,
training a random forest with 10,000 images takes less than 30
seconds.
RQ2: Aack norms. We refer to L0, L2, L∞, and L∗ as aack
norms. is research question focuses on evaluating whether
RAID’s detection generalizes within and across aack norms.
Within an aack norm, we train with (normal and) adversarial
images generated by an aack of a particular norm (e.g., PGD for
L∞, DF for L2) and measure the AUC score achieved by RAID
when testing with (normal and) adversarial images generated by a
dierent aack of the same norm (e.g., FGSM for L∞, CW for L2).
e results for L∞ are shown in Tab. 4, and for L2 in Tab. 5. e
rst column of the tables refers to the aack with which we train,
whereas the rst row indicates the used dataset as well as the aack
with which we test.
Table 3: AUC scores achieved byRAIDwhen trainedwith all
and tested on a subset of attacks.
L∞ L2 PGD FGSM BIM DF CW JSMA
MNIST 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.98
CIFAR-10 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.89 0.94
e results in Tab. 4 are impressive. RAID achieves the best
possible AUC score with 0.00 standard deviation for all aacks
within L∞. erefore, our detection technique generalizes perfectly
within this norm. As shown in Tab. 5 however, RAID does not
generalize as well within the L2 norm. e AUC scores in this table
are slightly lower than those in Tabs. 1 and 2, where we trained
with L2, DF, or CW and tested with the same. is also holds when
comparing with the scores in Tab. 3, where we trained with all
aacks and tested with L2, DF, or CW. ese results indicate that,
for the more powerful L2 norm, our detection technique is more
eective when trained with the aack it is expected to detect.
Across aack norms, we train with (normal and) adversarial
images generated by all aacks of a particular norm (e.g., PGD,
FGSM, and BIM of L∞) and measure the AUC score achieved by
RAIDwhen testing with (normal and) adversarial images generated
by all aacks of a dierent norm (e.g., DF and CW of L2). e
results are shown in Tab. 6. e rst column of the table refers to
Table 4: AUC scores achieved by RAID when trained with a
particular attack of the L∞ norm (shown in the rst column)
and tested with another of the same norm (rst row).
MNIST CIFAR-10
PGD FGSM BIM PGD FGSM BIM
PGD 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
FGSM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BIM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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Table 5: AUC scores achieved by RAID when trained with a
particular attack of the L2 norm (shown in the rst column)
and tested with another of the same norm (rst row).
MNIST CIFAR-10
DF CW DF CW
DF 0.88 0.86
CW 0.88 0.86
the norm with which we train, whereas the rst row indicates the
used dataset as well as the norm with which we test.
As previously observed (Tab. 3), when training with L∗, our
technique is most eective in detecting L∞ aacks and only slightly
less eective for other norms. When training with L2, RAID’s
detection generalizes quite well to all other aack norms (L∗, L∞,
and L0). e same holds when training with L0, although this
conguration is less eective for the CIFAR-10 dataset. ese results
suggest that training with stronger aacks generalizes to detecting
weaker ones. On the other hand, when training with the weaker
L∞ aacks, the AUC scores for the detection of L2 and L0 aacks
drop signicantly.
RQ3: Comparison with state of the art. We now compare
RAIDwith the three state-of-the-art detection techniques discussed
in Sect. 4.2, namely DSA, LSA, and mMutant.
For this experiment, we measure the AUC score achieved by
each technique when tested with each aack and aack norm. e
results are shown in Fig. 3 for MNIST and Fig. 4 for CIFAR-10. For
the techniques that require training, that is, for RAID, DSA, and
LSA, we train with L∗. We chose this conguration because it is the
most general, and thus, the most natural. In practice, a detection
technique is not a-priori aware of the type or norm of future aacks;
it is, therefore, safer to anticipate all of them.
To obtain the AUC scores in the gures, we test each technique
using normal and adversarial images, which are generated by the
aacks shown on the x-axes of the bar charts. In addition to the
aforementioned aacks, we add two more for this experiment. First,
we simulate an adaptive adversary against mMutant by introducing
CW-0.95, which is exactly the same as CW except that the con-
dence parameter is set to 0.95. In other words, CW-0.95 generates
adversarial images classied with a prediction condence of at least
0.95 at the expense of adding more distortion. Note that we only
add this aack for CIFAR-10 since CW cannot generate adversarial
inputs with high condence on MNIST. Second, we introduce CW-
Noise denoting that our test set contains, in addition to the ∼5,000
normal images, ∼5,000 adversarial images generated by CW as well
as ∼5,000 normal images with Gaussian noise (mean=0, std=0.2) by
following the guidelines presented in [9]. We apply the ltering
described in Sect. 4.2 on the test sets of all techniques.
As shown in Fig. 3, the eectiveness of RAID, DSA, and LSA
is comparable on the MNIST dataset. In the best case, RAID out-
performs DSA by 0.05 for CW, and LSA by 0.03 for CW-0.95. In
the worst case, LSA outperforms RAID by 0.02 for CW-Noise. e
eectiveness of mMutant varies signicantly. For example, it out-
performs all other techniques for the powerful CW aacks, but is
substantially worse for the simple PGD aacks. is is because
mMutant is based on the assumption that adversarial examples are
Table 6: AUC scores of RAIDwhen trained with a particular
norm (rst column) and tested with another (rst row).
MNIST CIFAR-10
L∗ L∞ L2 L0 L∗ L∞ L2 L0
L∗ 1.00 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.89 0.94
L∞ 0.84 0.67 0.68 0.77 0.54 0.52
L2 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.95 0.91
L0 0.92 0.90 0.91 0.81 0.73 0.85
sensitive to mutations, that is, they are typically classied with a
low prediction condence. However, iterative aacks such as BIM
and PGD generate adversarial images with very high prediction
condence (e.g., 0.99 almost all the time), which makes them more
insensitive, and hence, harder to detect by mMutant. In this sense,
the more distortion is added to the input, the lower the chance
that mMutant detects it since higher distortion typically increases
prediction condence.
Fig. 4 shows the same comparison for CIFAR-10. Here, RAID
consistently outperforms DSA and LSA, namely for L∗, L∞, L2,
FGSM, BIM, DF, CW, CW-Noise, and JSMA. eir eectiveness is
equal for PGD, and DSA outperforms RAID by 0.02 for CW-0.95.
RAID outperforms mMutant for L∗, L∞, PGD, FGSM, BIM, CW-
0.95, and CW-Noise, in the best case by 0.88 for PGD and in the
worst case by 0.09 for FGSM. On the other hand, mMutant looks
slightly more eective than RAID for L2 (by 0.03), DF (by 0.01),
CW (by 0.04), and JSMA (by 0.03). However, as shown with CW-
0.95, increasing prediction condence for these cases would reduce
mMutant’s eectiveness.
In addition to (oen signicantly) outperforming state-of-the-art
detection techniques, RAID is also the most consistent in terms of
eectiveness across dierent types of aacks and norms. Tab. 7
shows the ranges of AUC scores achieved by RAID, DSA, LSA, and
mMutant for the aacks in Figs. 3 and 4. As shown in the table, the
ranges are more stable for RAID than for any other technique.
In terms of performance, RAID is also very ecient. At runtime,
RAID requires (1) feeding the incoming input to the original neural
network to collect its AF and (2) feeding the AF to the detection
classier; in total, this takes less than a second as described in RQ1.
LSA, DSA, and mMutant demonstrate a similarly good runtime
performance. mMutant requires feeding the input to a number of
mutated neural networks (default is 500). Given that each neural-
network query takes less than a millisecond, mMutant can make a
decision under 1 second. Note that, although model mutation takes
much more time (i.e., per mutation slightly more than 5 seconds
for MNIST and slightly more than 15 seconds for CIFAR-10), it
is performed oine and incurs no runtime overhead. Similarly
to RAID, LSA and DSA involve feeding the input to the original
network and then feeding the extracted data to the classier; overall,
these steps also take around 1 second.
RQ4: Selection of monitored neurons. To determine how the
selection of monitored neurons impacts the eectiveness of our
technique, we rst measure the AUC scores achieved by RAID for
dierent numbers of monitored neurons, namely 1, 4, 16, 64, and
256 (or all essential neurons if their total number is smaller than
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Figure 3: AUC scores of RAID, DSA, LSA, and mMutant on the MNIST dataset when tested on all attacks and norms.
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Figure 4: AUC scores of RAID, DSA, LSA, and mMutant on the CIFAR-10 dataset when tested on all attacks and norms.
256). For this experiment, we train and test RAID on each aack
norm. e results are presented in Fig. 5, where the plot on the le
is for MNIST and the plot on the right for CIFAR-10.
As shown in the gure, more neurons lead to beer AUC scores,
although the dierences are insignicant when comparing 64 and
256 neurons. is is expected because the larger the number of mon-
itored neurons, the higher are the chances of correctly detecting
more normal and adversarial examples. In particular, the activation
value of a neuron may uctuate only for a specic set of normal
and adversarial images, whereas the activation value of another
neuron may uctuate for a completely disjoint set. erefore, when
monitoring both of these neurons, our technique is likely to be
more eective. In practice, with only a single neuron to monitor,
RAID may be lucky with its selection as for L∞ and CIFAR-10 in
Fig. 5, but this is typically not the case as is also shown in the gure.
To further investigate the impact of monitored neurons on our
technique, we also performed the same experiment when selecting
the best neurons, that is, those with the largest dierence of mean
activation ngerprints (see Sect. 3.2), and when selecting the worst
neurons. Note that the worst neurons are normally ltered out by
our technique as inessential. e results are shown in Figs. 6 and 7.
For this experiment, unlike for the one in Fig. 5, we do not perform
8 runs of RAID since the sets of best and worst neurons are chosen
deterministically.
Table 7: Range of AUC scores achieved by RAID, DSA, LSA,
and mMutant when tested on the attacks of Figs. 3 and 4.
RAID DSA LSA mMutant
MNIST 0.95–1.00 0.92–1.00 0.93–1.00 0.27–0.99
CIFAR-10 0.85–1.00 0.64–1.00 0.61–1.00 0.12–0.97
When comparing the AUC scores of Figs. 5 and 6, we observe
that selecting the best neurons mostly benets congurations with
a small number of neurons. For 64 neurons, which is the congura-
tion used throughout our experiments, RAID with the best neurons
is beer only for L∞ and MNIST and only by 0.01, which justies
the value of our ltering threshold (50%). Interestingly, some AUC
scores achieved by RAID with the best neurons are slightly worse
than those with random neurons. is may happen when the acti-
vation values of the best neurons uctuate for overlapping sets of
images, whereas there are worse neurons that would help with the
detection of other images.
e AUC scores achieved by RAID when selecting the worst
neurons (Fig. 7) are signicantly worse than those in Figs. 5 and 6,
which justies the existence of our ltering threshold. For CIFAR-
10, all AUC scores are 0.5. is is because the neural network
for the CIFAR-10 dataset has a much larger number of neurons in
comparison to the network for MNIST (see Sect. 4.2). Consequently,
there are also many more inessential neurons.
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Figure 5: AUC scores of RAID for all attack norms versus
the number of neurons (le: MNIST, right: CIFAR-10).
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Figure 6: AUC scores of RAID for all norms when monitor-
ing the best neurons (le: MNIST, right: CIFAR-10).
RQ5: Multiple classiers. As explained in Sect. 3.3, P-RAID is
the robust version of RAID against adaptive adversaries. In this
research question, we investigate the eectiveness of a pool of
classiers versus a single classier. In particular, we compare the
AUC scores achieved by RAID and P-RAID, with a pool size of 32
random forests (each with 32 estimators). We trained both tools
with the expected aacks (e.g., trained with FGSM and tested with
FGSM). e results are presented in Tab. 8.
As shown in the table, the eectiveness of the tools is almost
identical. We mark the three dierences in bold; the achieved AUC
scores dier by 0.01 across the two implementations. Consequently,
using the P-RAID version of our approach has no negative impact
on its success in detecting adversarial images. On the contrary,
it oers the theoretical benet of being more powerful against
adaptive adversaries.
On the other hand, state-of-the-art tools mentioned in RQ3 do
not claim robustness against adaptive adversaries. e original idea
behind LSA is already shown to be bypassed [11]. For DSA, there
is no specic mechanism against adaptive adversaries, and such
classier-based detectors are typically found to be weak against
adaptive adversaries [11]. In our experiments, we show the weak-
ness of mMutant by introducing CW-0.95.
RQ6: Dierent classier types. We now study the impact of
dierent classier types and their parameters on the eectiveness
of our approach. In particular, we use the following classier types:
DT: Decision tree [49]
RF: Random forest with 32, 64, and 128 estimators [7]
AB: AdaBoost with 32, 64, and 128 estimators [51]
KNN: k-nearest neighbors with 3 and 5 neighbors [5, 43]
We selected these classiers because they are simple when com-
pared to huge detection networks [38], on the other hand, they
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Figure 7: AUC scores of RAID for all norms when monitor-
ing the worst neurons (le: MNIST, right: CIFAR-10).
Table 8: AUC scores achieved by RAID and P-RAID when
trained and tested on the same attacks.
MNIST CIFAR-10
RAID P-RAID RAID P-RAID
L∗ 0.99 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.01 0.96 ± 0.00 0.96 ± 0.01
L∞ 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00
L2 0.98 ± 0.00 0.98 ± 0.01 0.90 ± 0.00 0.90 ± 0.02
PGD 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00
FGSM 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00
BIM 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00
DF 0.99 ± 0.00 0.98 ± 0.00 0.91 ± 0.00 0.91 ± 0.02
CW 0.98 ± 0.01 0.98 ± 0.01 0.91 ± 0.01 0.90 ± 0.02
JSMA 0.99 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.01 0.96 ± 0.00 0.96 ± 0.01
are known to be eective in many tasks. Note that RF and AB are
referred to as ensemble methods because they consist of multiple
classiers, in this case decision trees.
For this experiment, we train one classier of each type (not a
pool) with the expected aack norms. We then measure the AUC
scores achieved by RAID when using each of these classiers. e
results are presented in Figs. 8 and 9 for MNIST and CIFAR-10,
respectively. As shown in the bar charts, the ensemble methods RF
and AB are more eective than DT and KNN on the two datasets.
KNN is slightly beer than AB for MNIST, but noticeably worse for
CIFAR-10. ese results suggest that ensembles of simple classiers,
such as decision trees, are sucient for our approach to be very
eective in practice.
Out of the two ensemble methods, RF is more eective than AB.
e number of RF estimators does not have a signicant impact on
the AUC scores. Specically, when using 64 estimators, the AUC
scores can increase by up to 0.01 in comparison to 32 estimators
(for L2 aacks in both datasets, and for L0 in CIFAR-10). ere
is also no dierence between using 64 and 128 estimators. Recall,
however, that the number of estimators aects the training time,
and therefore, RF32 can be trained more eciently.
4.5 reats to Validity
We identify the following threats to the validity of our experiments.
External validity. External validity ensures that the results of
an experimental evaluation generalize [54]. Our results may not
generalize to other datasets or network models [54]. However, we
use two of the most popular datasets for evaluating state-of-the-art
adversarial-image detection techniques (e.g., [29, 60]) and borrow
the models from one of these techniques [29]. e results may also
not generalize to other aacks although we generate adversarial
images using six well-known aacks across three aack norms.
In our evaluation, we compare RAID with three adversarial-
image detection techniques, but our results may not generalize to
others [54]. To alleviate this threat, we selected the most recent
detection techniques published at top venues. Moreover, our imple-
mentation is open source so that others can reproduce our results
and perform more extensive comparisons.
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Figure 8: AUC scores achieved by RAID on the MNIST dataset when using dierent classier types.
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Figure 9: AUC scores achieved by RAID on the CIFAR-10 dataset when using dierent classier types.
Internal validity. e internal validity [54] of randomized ap-
proaches may be compromised by a potentially biased selection
of random seeds. We avoid this pitfall by performing all of our
experiments 8 times, each time using a dierent random seed for
the classier and a dierent randomly selected set of neurons. We
report mean results and their standard deviation.
5 RELATEDWORK
Adversarial robustness. e area of adversarial machine learn-
ing has been very active since the discovery of adversarial examples
for neural networks [58]. On one side, more eective adversarial
aacks are being developed. On the other side, researchers de-
velop new techniques to obtain robust neural networks. Here, we
consider two types of robustness techniques: (1) those that detect
adversarial examples, and (2) those that aim to build a network
for which it is dicult to generate adversarial examples, namely
defenses. According to this classication, RAID falls into the rst
category.
Adversarial-input detection. Despite these eorts to ensure
robustness of neural networks, new aacks oen evade existing
defense or detection techniques. On the detection side, Grosse et
al., Gong et al., and Metzen et al. [22, 24, 38] train a secondary
classier for detecting adversarial examples; in this aspect, these
techniques are similar to ours. From these three, the approach
presented by Metzen et al. [38] is the closest to our work. However,
unlike their technique, we propose a much simpler methodology
and an extension (i.e., in P-RAID) to handle adaptive adversaries.
Hendrycks and Gimpel, Bhagoji et al., and Li and Li [6, 26, 32]
propose methods based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
Feinman et al. [19] introduce two techniques, called kernel-density
estimation and Bayesian neural-network uncertainty. Carlini and
Wagner [11], however, nd all of the aforementioned techniques
ineective for providing a thorough detection mechanism.
While there are other works that claim to be eective in detecting
adversarial inputs, they have already been surpassed or bypassed
by later work. For example, work on statistical detection [50] can be
bypassed [27]. Similarly, feature squeezing [62] can be defeated [53],
and both methods by Zantedeschi et al. [63] and MagNet [37] are
shown not to be robust [12, 33].
Even more recent detection techniques include work that special-
izes on adaptive adversaries [28], focuses on black-box aacks [14],
and makes use of the SHAP explainability technique [20]. Lastly,
two detection techniques [29, 60] have recently been proposed by
the soware-engineering community. We provide a detailed de-
scription of these in the previous section, where we compare them
with RAID.
Defenses against adversarial inputs. On the defense side, ad-
versarial retraining was found to be eective [36]. Despite this,
many defenses [40, 46] are circumvented by other work [4, 10, 25].
Generally, one should follow recent guidelines for properly evalu-
ating the robustness of a neural network [9].
Neural-network testing. e increasing popularity of deep-
learning systems and their vulnerability to adversarial examples
also motivated research into testing techniques for neural networks.
Existing research in the area adapts testing methodologies from
traditional soware engineering. DeepXplore [48] is the rst to
introduce a specialized coverage criterion (i.e., neuron coverage)
for neural networks. Subsequently, new such coverage criteria
have been proposed. For example, DeepGauge [34] renes neuron
coverage, DeepCover [55] adapts MC/DC from traditional soware
testing, and DeepCT [35] investigates combinatorial testing. How-
ever, more recent work argues that there is limited correlation
between coverage and robustness of neural networks [16].
Eniser et al. [17] make use of fault-localizationmetrics for nding
neurons that can be exploited to fool networks. Sun et al. [56] adapt
concolic testing [8, 21, 52] for generating test inputs to neural net-
works. Other approaches make use of coverage-guided fuzzing for
input generation [15, 42, 61]. DeepTest [59] and DeepRoad [64] fo-
cus on generating test inputs for deep-learning-based autonomous
driving systems. Unlike the above testing techniques, RAID pro-
poses an online detection technique for adversarial examples.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a novel mechanism, namely RAID, for de-
tecting adversarial examples in neural networks. In addition to this,
we introduce P-RAID, which is designed to be robust even against
adaptive adversaries. We extensively evaluate our technique and
10
show its eectiveness, for instance by achieving a 90% AUC score
against the strongest aacks (i.e., CW, DF) and perfect detection
against weaker adversaries (i.e., PGD, BIM, FGSM). e comparison
with three state-of-the-art detection techniques shows that RAID
is both more stable and more eective. In the future, we plan to
test our tool on other threat models, larger neural networks, and
dierent tasks, such as natural language processing.
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